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KENYA SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS v ATTORNEY GENERAL & ANOTHER [2011] eKLR
THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI
MILIMANI LAW COURTS
 
Miscellaneous Criminal Application 685 of 2010
THE KENYA SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL                 
COMMISSION OF JURISTS……………………APPLICANT
-VERSUS-
ATTORNEY GENERAL…………………….1ST RESPONDENT
MINISTER OF STATE FOR PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATION 
AND INTERNAL SECURITY.........................2ND RESPONDENT 
R U L I N G
The parties to this application
1.    The Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists [ICJ Kenya] is the Applicant.
2.   The Hon. The Attorney General is the 1st Respondent.
3.   The Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security is the 2nd Respondent.
4.   The Kenyans for Justice and Development Trust is the 3rd  Respondent.  [Through its Trustees
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Andrew Okiya Omtatah Okoiti and Oyugi Neto Augustinho]
 
The Subject matter
5.   President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir].  The name Omar Ahmad Hassan Al
Bashir is used interchangeably with Omar Al Bashir.
Factual and Legal Background
It is axiomatic that the Kenyan State has no autonomous existence outside the framework of the
community of nations, and that on this account, its regime of law and Constitutional order inter-face with
the other states under the auspices of international law. That one of the beacons of international law is
multilateral treaties, to which Kenya and other states are parties. The Rome Statute [ICC] is one such
treaty. It establishes the International Criminal Court [ICC], which prosecutes and judge, in the event of
the commission of certain named categories of offences referred to in Article 5 thereof. These are
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression. 
In relation to such crimes, state parties, such as Kenya, has agreed to cede some of their jurisdiction
of crime. 
Kenya’s International Crimes Act [2008] bears a tell-tale preamble which is couched in the following
terms;
“ An Act of Parliament to make provisions for the punishment of certain International Crimes,
namely, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and to enable Kenya to co-operate
with the International Criminal Court [ICC] established by the Rome Statute in the performance of
its functions”. 
The International Crimes Act entered into force on 1st January, 2009. Indeed the Constitution of
Kenya, 2010, which was promulgated on 27th August, 2010 carries a transitional clause [sixth schedule,
clause 7(1)] which stipulates:
“ All the law in force immediately before the effective date [read 27th August, 2010] continues in
force and should be construed with the alterations, adoptions, qualifications and exceptions
necessary to bring it into conformity with the Constitution” 
Kenyan state organs had their positions defined in Article 12(1) of the Rome Statute which provide;
“A state which becomes a party to this statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court
with respect to the Crimes referred to in Article 5” 
Against that backdrop of legal grounding the International Criminal Court [ICC] in fact issued two sets of
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warrants. One, on 4th March, 2009 with five counts of Crime against humanity, against President Omar
Ahmed Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] Two, on 12th July, 2010 with three counts of genocide also
against President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] the President of the sovereign
Republic of Sudan.
The said warrants were issued pursuant to Article 91 as read together with Article 92 of the Rome
Statute.
Pursuant to the aforesaid warrants the Registrar of the International Criminal Court [ICC] sent initial
request on 6th March, 2009 for co-operation to all states parties for arrest and surrender of President
Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] should he set foot on their respective territory.
Subsequent to the issuance of the second warrant, the Registrar of the International Criminal Court [ICC]
sent a supplementary request on 21st July, 2010 couched on the said terms as the first one.
It is common knowledge that President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] set foot in
Kenya on 27th August, 2010 when the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 was promulgated reportedly on the
invitation of the Kenyan Government. The Kenyan Government as the host failed, neglected or refused
to arrest and surrender him to the International Criminal Court. Hence this application by the Applicant to
force the Government of Kenya to comply with its international obligations under the Constitution of
Kenya, 2010 the International Crimes Act, 2008 and the Rome Statute[ICC].
The Application
By a Chamber Summons application dated 18th November 2010, pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the
Constitution, Section 32 of the International Crimes Act, and all other enabling provisions of the law, the
Applicant seeks orders:-
1. That this honourable Court be pleased to issue a provisional warrant of arrest against one
Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] the President of Sudan.
2. That there be issued orders to the 2nd Respondent, the Minister of State for Provincial
Administration, to effect the said warrant of arrest, if and when, the said President Omar Ahmad
Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] sets foot within the territory of the Republic of Kenya. 
3. That the honourable Court be pleased to issue such further orders, writ, or direction as the
honourable Court shall deem fit and just in the circumstances.
The application is predicated upon the affidavit of, George Kegoro, the Executive Director – ICJ
Kenya, sworn on the 18th day of November 2010.
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The application is based on the grounds:-
1. That the Constitution of Kenya at Article 2 (5) applies all treaties and conventions that have
been ratified by Kenya to be part of the Laws of Kenya.
2. That Kenya ratified the Rome Statute on the 15th March 2005 and followed up on that act by
domesticating the Statute vide the International Crimes Act, 2008. 
3. That the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 at Article 3 puts an obligation on every person to respect,
uphold and defend the Constitution.
4. That there are two outstanding warrants of arrest against President Omar Ahmad Hassan
Albashir [Omar Al Bashir] issued by the International Criminal Court [ICC] on 4th March, 2009 and
12th July 2010 respectively.
5. That there are also two requests for co-operation in the arrest and surrender of President
Omar Ahmad Albashir [Omar Al Bashir] issued by the International Criminal Court [ICC] on 6th
March, 2009 and 21st July, 2010 to States that are parties to the Rome Statute.
6. That President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] came to Kenya, on the 27th
August, 2010, However, despite the existence of the said warrants of arrest, the Respondents in
utter disregard of their obligations, under international law and the Laws of Kenya, failed to
enforce the said warrants of arrest.
7. That the Applicant is apprehensive that President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al
Bashir] will again in the near future be coming into Kenya to attend a meeting convened by
Kenya through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
8. That previously when President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] came to Kenya
on the 27th August 2010, the Respondents failed and refused to effect arrest on him despite the
existence of the said warrants of arrest against him which fact was within their knowledge.
9. That the Applicant is apprehensive that should President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir
[Omar Al Bashir] come to Kenya, the Respondents in total disregard of the law will once again fail
to effect an arrest against him as they previously did.
10.That it is in this premise, that the Applicant is making this application. 
The Applicant’s Case
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On behalf of the Applicant, I was urged that the objectives of the Applicant are inter-alia, the
development, strengthening and protection of the rule of law; and in particular to keep under review all
aspects of the rule of law and human rights within the Republic of Kenya and take such action as will be
of assistance in promoting or ensuring the enjoyment of these rights.
That the Applicant is aware of the existence of the warrants of arrest against President Omar Ahmad
Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir], the President of the Sovereign Republic of Sudan. The copies of the
two aforesaid warrants are exhibited as “GK 1” and “GK 2” respectively.
That the said arrest warrants were issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court
[ICC] respectively on 4th March, 2009 with five counts of crime against humanity and two of war crimes
and on 12th July, 2010 with three counts of genocide for allegedly orchestrating atrocities in the Western
Province of Dafur in Sudan. This was pursuant to Article 91 as read together with Article 92 of the Rome
Statute which provides;
“1. A request for arrest and surrender shall be made in writing. In urgent cases, a request may
be made by any medium capable of delivering a written record, provided that the request shall be
confirmed through the channel provided for in article 87, paragraph 1(a).
2. In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender of a person for whom a warrant of
arrest has been issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 58, the request shall contain or be
supported by:
a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the person, and information as
to that person’s probable location;
b) A copy of the warrant of arrest; and 
c) Such documents, statements or information as may be necessary to meet the requirements
for the surrender process in the requested State, except that those requirements should not be
more burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition pursuant to treaties or
arrangements between the requested State and other States and should, if possible, be less
burdensome, taking into account the distinct nature of the Court.
3. In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender of a person already convicted, the request
shall contain or be supported by;
a) A copy of any warrant of arrest for that person;
b) A copy of the judgment of conviction;
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c) Information to demonstrate that the person sought is the one referred to in the judgment of
conviction; and
d) If the person sought has been sentenced, a copy of the sentence imposed and, in the case
of a sentence for imprisonment, a statement of any time already served and the time remaining to
be served.
4) Upon the request of the Court, a State Party shall consult with the Court, either generally or
with respect to a specific matter, regarding any requirements under its national law that may
apply under paragraph 2 (c). During the consultations, the State Party shall advice the Court of
the specific requirements of its national law”.
 
Article 92 provides;
“1. In urgent cases, the Court may request the provisional arrest of the person sought,
pending presentations of the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as
specified in article 91.
2. The request for provisional arrest shall be made by any medium capable of delivering a
written record and shall contain;
a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the person, and information as
to that person’s probable location;
b) A concise statement of the crimes for which the person’s arrest is sought and of the facts
which are alleged to constitute those crimes, including, where possible, the date and location of
the crime;
c) A statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or a judgment of conviction against the
person sought; and
d) A statement that a request for surrender or the person sought will follow
3. A person who is provisionally arrested may be released from custody if the requested State
has not received the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as
specified in article 91 within the time limits specified in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
However, the person may consent to surrender before the expiration of this period if permitted by
the law of the requested State. In such a case, the requested State shall proceed to surrender the
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person to the Court as soon as possible.
4. The fact that the person sought has been released from custody pursuant to paragraph 3
shall not prejudice the subsequent arrest and surrender of that person if the request for
surrender and the documents supporting the request are delivered at a later date”.
Subsequent to the issuance of the second warrant of arrest, the Registrar of the International Criminal
Court [ICC] sent a supplementary request on 21st July, 2010 for co-operation to all State Parties to the
Rome Statute for the arrest and surrender of President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir]
should he set foot on their respective territory. A copy of the said request for co-operation is exhibited
and marked as “GK 4”.
It is common knowledge that Kenya is a state party to the Rome Statute having signed the same on
11th August, 2005 and ratified the same on 15th March 2005, becoming the 98th State Party.
Kenya enhanced its commitment to the fight against impunity in 2008 by domesticating the Rome
Statute in its domestic laws through the enactment of the International Crimes, Act 2008 which entered
into fore on 1st January, 2009. In this regard section 29 and 30 of the International Crimes Act, 2005 is
in point.
Section 29 provides:
“S.29. (1) If a request for surrender, other than a request for provisional arrest referred to in
Section 28 
(2). The Minister shall, if satisfied that the request is supported by the information and
documents required by article 91 of the Rome Statute, notify a Judge of the High Court in writing
that it has been made and request that the Judge issue a warrant for the arrest of the person
whose surrender is sought.
(2)   If a notice is sent to a Judge under subsection (1) the Minister shall also send to the Judge a
copy of the request and supporting documents”. 
 
Section 30 provides:
 “S.30. (1) after receiving a request under Section 29, the Judge – may issue a warrant in the
prescribed form for the arrest of the person if the Judge is satisfied on the basis of information
presented to him that – 
(a) The person is or is suspected of being in Kenya or may come to Kenya; and
(b) There are reasonable grounds to believe that that person is the person to whom the request
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for surrender from the ICC relates.
(2)   The Judge shall give reasons for the issue or refusal to issue a warrant under subsection
(1)”.
 
The International Crimes Act, 2008 brings into the purview of domestic law the crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity and war crimes which are recognized under the Rome Statute and also
provides for procedures for the arrest and surrender of persons indicted by the International Criminal
Court [ICC] should they be within Kenya’s territory.
It was the Applicant’s case that the International Crimes Act 2008, like the Rome Statute, does not
recognize immunity on the basis of official capacity. That is to say, all persons are treated equally before
the law irrespective of their official capacity.
Despite Kenya Government being averse and/or aware of its commitments and obligations under
international law and municipal law President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] was
invited and hosted by the good Government of Kenya on 27th August, 2010 during the promulgation of
the country’s new Constitution.
It was the Applicant’s further case that the presence of the said President in the Kenyan territory was
in violation of Kenya’s obligations under the Rome Statute, the International Crimes Act, 2008 and the
new Constitution of Kenya, 2010. That the failure, neglect or refusal to arrest the said President violates
the basic tenets of International law.
The hosting of the said President in Kenya in violation of Kenya’s obligations under the Rome
Statute [ICC] and the International Crimes Act, 2008, and the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 raises serious
concern over Kenya’s commitment to combating impunity for the most serious crimes against humanity.
On the 23rd day of September, 2010 at the sidelines of the 65th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly held in New York, His Excellency President Mwai Kibaki, pronounced that he would convene a
second Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Special Summit in Sudan in November,
2010, to inter-alia discuss the up-coming South Sudan Referendum. On learning of the impending
possible visit by the said President, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court [ICC] on
25th October, 2010 requested the Republic of Kenya to furnish it with reasons, if any, which would
impede or prevent the arrest and surrender of President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al
Bashir] in the event he visits Kenya. A copy of the said request is exhibited and marked as “GK 6”.
In response the Government of Kenya through the Hon. The Attorney General’s office sent a
response to the ICC stating that IGAD meeting would not be held in Kenya and hence President Omar
Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] would not be coming to Kenya.   A copy of the report from the
Registrar of the ICC transmitting the response is exhibited and marked as “GK 7”.
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The Applicant on 19th October 2010 wrote two letters. One, to His Excellency the President and
another, to the Right Honourable the Prime-Minister of Kenya, Raila Amolo Odinga, raising concerns
over the possibility of a second visit by President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] and
calling on the two principals to take their international and domestic obligations seriously. Copies of the
two letters are exhibited and marked “GK 9” and “GK 10” respectively.
On 9th November 2010, the Applicant received a response from the Prime-Minister’s office exhibited
and marked as “GK 11” indicating that the IGAD meeting had been moved from Nairobi to Addis-
Ababa. The said letter also pointed out that the presence of President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al
Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] in Kenyan’s territory on 27th August, 2010 was not a matter of mutual agreement
with the Grand Coalition.
It was the Applicant’s last and final position, that the disjointed approach in responding to requests
from the International Criminal Court [ICC] is a testimony of the different interests that are at play in the
Grand Coalition Government, when it comes to issues touching on the Rome Statute. Hence the
Applicant’s interest in prosecuting this application in line with its objectives and mandate.
The International Crimes Act, 2008 anticipates a situation where the state may acquiesce or renege
on its obligations and makes provisions for other persons other than the Government to seek for a
provisional arrest warrant from the High Court, and serve it on the Minister in charge of Internal Security,
thereby reminding the Government of its international and domestic obligations, under the Rome Statute
and the International Crimes Act, 2008 and demanding that the Government honours its obligations.
The 1st and 2nd Respondent’s Case
The application was opposed by the 1st Respondent vide the replying affidavit of Victor Mule, a State
counsel in the State Law Office, Department of Public Prosecutions sworn on the 7th day of December
2010.
On behalf of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, it was urged that the request for a provisional warrant can
only be made by the ICC. That it is the ICC to demonstrate the reasons and the urgency. In this regard
reliance was placed on Article 92 of the Rome Statute
 [Supra]
That Section 32 and 33 of the International Crimes Act, 2008 derive directly from Article 92 of the
Rome Statute. Hence section 32 and 33 of the International Crimes Act, 2008, should be read together
with Article 92 of the Rome Statute for their full tenor and effect.
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A reading of the aforesaid Sections and the said Article leaves no doubt that the request can only be
made by the ICC in urgent cases. In the premises, the Applicant (ICJ-Kenya Chapter) therefore lacks
locus-standi as it has not stated its (ICJ-Kenya Chapter), interest in the case. Moreso in the absence of
any indication that it has been instructed to act on behalf of the ICC.
By its very nature a provisional warrant can therefore be sought/applied for and issued where a
formal request for arrest and surrender has been made.
Ordinarily, in matters of mutual legal assistance and extradition, foreign requests are channeled to the
Hon. The Attorney General. If the Attorney General is satisfied as to the authenticity of the request he
will then move the High Court for issuance of a warrant and conduct the proceedings on behalf of the
requesting party. This process is not done by an individual or any authority. The Applicant envisaged
under Section 29 of the International Crimes Act, 2008 is the Minister, in charge of Internal Security, of
the Sovereign Republic of Kenya. Thus the Applicant under both sections should be the State as
opposed to the Applicant herein or any other legal person.
An application for a provisional warrant of arrest under Section 32 of International Crimes Act, 2008
can only be made upon receipt of a request from the ICC courtesy of Article 92 of the Rome Statute.
Since, there is no evidence that such a request for a provisional warrant has been made to the Kenya
Government by the ICC, the High Court lacks jurisdiction to hear, determine or give orders sought in this
application.
Last but not least, that the application is moot. It is moribund and fruitless since the IGAD Summit
meeting which could provide an opportunity for President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al
Bashir] was held in Addis Ababa in November 2010. Hence the argument that the said President might
come to Kenya is speculative and cannot be a basis upon which the court can issue warrant even if the
right procedure had been followed.
During the pendency of the proceedings M/S Kenyans for Justice and Development Trust [KEJUDE]
through its Trustees, Andrew Okiya Omtatah Okoiti and Augustinho Neto Oyugi, applied to be enjoined
in these proceedings by a Notice of Motion dated 8th December, 2010. By consent of the parties herein
the application by way of Notice of Motion aforesaid [for enjoinment] was conceded to thereby making
KEJUDE the 3rd Respondent in this application.
The 3rd Respondent’s case
On behalf of the 3rd Respondent, it was urged that the Vienna Convection on Diplomatic Relations
Treaty is in conflict with the International Crimes Act, 2008.
The African Union’s decision adopted in July, 2009 at a Summit in Sirte Libya, under the auspices of
the Assembly of heads of States, the AU’s highest decision making organ, directed all AU member
States to withhold co-operation with the ICC in respect of arrest and surrender of President Omar
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Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir.
The African Union has repeatedly called for the United Nations Security Council to invoke Article 16
of the Rome Statute to suspend the warrant of arrest against President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir
[Omar Al Bashir]. That Kenya is a member of the African Union and decisions and resolutions of the AU
are binding on Kenya and its people. That Kenya is a neighbour to Sudan which has declared the
warrant of arrest against Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] as an act of aggression.
Hence the execution of the warrants shall jeopardize or risk the lives and property of an estimated
500,000 Kenyans [Statistics not exhibited] in the Sudan.
The issuance of warrant of arrest issued by the Kenyan Courts may lead to a deterioration of the
relations between the two States. That Kenya is a guarantor to the comprehensive peace agreement that
ended the civil war in Sudan. As such Kenya should not take action that will precipitate instability in
Sudan.
Issues Arising
I am grateful to all counsel for their assistance and in put in this application.
I have carefully considered the issues raised by the application and the evidence vis-à-vis the law. I
have equally taken into due consideration all the authorities cited before me even though I have not
taken the liberty to quote them in extenso. Having done so, I now take the following view of the issues
raised by this application.
Article 2(5) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides:
“ The general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya” 
In the premises, it is clear to me that the said Constitution incorporates the general rules of International
Law in the Courts of Kenya. The Rome Statute is an International treaty and hence embodies rules of
International law.
Article 1 of the Rome Statute provides that;
“An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall be a permanent
institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to
national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning of the Court shall be governed by
the provisions of this Statute”. 
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In the premises the ICC [Rome Statute] forms part of the laws of Kenya. Such a position is further
fortified by the enactment of the International Crimes Act, 2008 [Act No. 16 of 2008, Section 4[1] of which
provides;
“The provisions of the Rome Statute specified in subsection (2) shall have the force of law in
Kenya in relation to the following matters;
(a)The making of requests by the ICC to Kenya for assistance and the method of dealing with
those requests;
(b)The conduct of an investigation by the Prosecutor or the ICC;
(c)The bringing and determination of proceedings before the ICC;
(d)The enforcement in Kenya of sentences of imprisonment or other measures imposed by the
ICC, and any related matters;
(e)The making of requests by Kenya to the ICC for assistance and the method of dealing with
those requests”.
 
In my judgment, therefore, the Rome Statute is in conformity with the Constitution of Kenya, 2010.
To buttress this position further Article 2(6) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 provides;
“Any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this
Constitution.”
The Rome Statute is one such treaty ratified by Kenya. Accordingly, the Constitution of Kenya, 2010
does not in any way reject the role of the International Institutions such as the ICC.
I posit that the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 require those exercising Judicial authority or functions to
be guided inter-alia, by the principles of the Constitution of [Article 159(2)(e)] and such principles are
defined in Article[10(2) (b)] as:
“Human-dignity, equity, social justice, inclusiveness, equality, human rights, non-
discrimination and protection of the marginalized”  
Such values, I am persuaded, cannot be given fulfillment by Kenya acting in isolation of the community
of nations. I am convinced that it is essential to recognize and facilitate the role of the International
Criminal Court [ICC] operating within the frame-work of the Rome-Statute in the frameworkof the Kenyan
Legal System.
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In this regard, Article 165(3)(d) of the Constitution of Kenya gives the High Court Jurisdiction to hear
any questions in respect of the interpretation of the Constitution including the determination of:
“Article 165 (3)(d)
(i)the question whether any law is inconsistent with or in contravention of this Constitution;
 
(ii)the question whether anything said to be done under the authority of this Constitution or of
any law is inconsistent with, or in contravention of, this Constitution; 
(iii)any matter relating to Constitutional powers of State organs in respect of country
government and any matter relating to the Constitutional relationship between the levels of
government; and
(iv)a question relating to conflict of law under Article 191; and
e) any other jurisdiction, original or appellate, conferred on it by legislation”. 
Further, in the context of Kenya, the High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction, original or appellate,
conferred on it by legislation. In this regard the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 and the International Crimes
Act 2008 confers jurisdiction on the High Court to enforce the Rome Statute.
The foregoing apart, in the realm of International Law, under the principle of universality, any State
is empowered to bring to trial persons accused of international crimes regardless of the place of the
commission of the crime, or the nationality of the offender.
This principle was first proclaimed in customary international law in the 17th Century, with regard to
piracy. Any State was authorized to arrest and bring to justice persons suspected of engaging in piracy,
whatever the nationality and the place of the commission of the crime.
The rationale behind the exceptional authorization to States to depart from this classic principle of
territoriality or nationality was the need to fight jointly against a form of criminality that affected all States.
Each State knew that by bringing to justice suspected pirates it was acting to protect at the same time its
own interests and those of other States. Subsequently the same jurisdictional ground was included in the
Geneva Conventions on War Crimes, the 1984 Convention Against Torture and a string of
international treaties on terrorism.
With regard to the 1984 Convention Against Torture and German Convention on War Victims,
the rationale was different from the one of piracy. The rationale was to authorize the States to
prosecute and punish, on behalf of the whole international community, persons responsible for special
cases of war crime [or grave breaches of the 1948 Geneva Conventions], torture, terrorism with a
view to safeguarding universal values. Thus any State is authorized to substitute itself for the national
http://www.kenyalaw.org - Page 13/20
KENYA SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS v ATTORNEY GENERAL & ANOTHER [2011] eKLR
judicial forum, namely the territorial or national States, should neither of them bring proceedings against
the alleged author of an international crime. Universal jurisdiction has been recognized in the US for a
long time. American Courts have endorsed the principle in numerous occasions
        For example in the case of Yunis, the defendant was a citizen of Lebanon accused in
participating in the hijacking of a Jordanian airline that resulted in the passengers (including several
Americans) being held hostage. He was brought on trial in the United States after being arrested at sea
by US authorities. Yunis challenged the jurisdiction of the US courts, arguing that there was no nexus
between the hijacking and the US territory (the aircraft did not fly over the US airspace or have contact
with the US territory). In its judgment of 12th February 1988, the District Court of Columbia dismissed the
defendants motion and affirmed the US jurisdiction. It held, inter-alia,that;
“Not only is the United States acting on behalf of the world order, but the United States has its
own interest in protecting its nationals [See 681.F Supp.896 (DDC) at 903]”.
 
Universal jurisdiction is the jus cogens obligation under international law. Jus cogens is defined as “a
pre-emptory norm of general international law” accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. They render
void any other pre-emptory rules which come in conflict with them.
Genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are regarded under international law as deliciti
jus gentium. They constitute a corpus of crimes that are an affront to humanity and its existence.
Keeping these crimes in check is important and fundamental to the international public order. The Rome
statute has jurisdiction over the said crimes. The Rome Statute is therefore binding on the parties that
are interested in the maintenance of that public order whether they are signatories or not. There is no
gainsaying that Kenya belongs to this category of state.
I subscribe to the view that the Rome Statute obligations are in any case customary international
law which a State cannot contravene. Violating customary international law is intentionally violating
fundamental rules of international public policy. This would be detrimental to the international legal
system and how that system and the society it serves defines itself.
        I further subscribe to the view that the duty to prosecute international crimes has developed into
jus-cogens and customary international law, thus delegating States to prosecute perpetrators
wherever they may be found. The State parties to the ICC are under a duty to prosecute or extradite
perpetrators to the ICC for prosecution.
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The universality principle has been upheld in the different versions; both predicated upon the notion
that the Judge asserting universal jurisdiction so acts to substitute for the defaulting territorial or national
State;
A State may prosecute persons accused of international crimes regardless of their nationality, the place
of the commission of the crime, the nationality of the victim and even whether or not the accused is in
custody or at any rate present in the forum State. A classic case is the Pinochet one.
Pinochet regime was characterized by human rights violations. He was arrested on 16th October,
1998 during a visit to the UK, based on a Spanish provisional arrest (issued by Judge Balthazar Garson)
because of the alleged responsibility of the murder of Spanish citizens in Chamber during the reign. The
Pinochet case is significant for international law and the principle of universal jurisdiction mainly because
for the first time ever, the British House of Lords decided that former heads of State accused of torture
did not enjoy immunity.
Yet another classic case is that of Eichmann, [see ILR,36,at 304] where the Supreme Court of Israel
in its concluding remarks held as follows;
“Not only do all crimes attributed to the appellant bear an international character, but their
harmful and murderers effects were so embracing and widespread as to shake the international
community to its very foundation. The State of Israel was therefore entitled, pursuant to the
principle of universal jurisdiction and its capacity as guardian of international law and an agent
for its enforcement, to try the appellant. That being the case no importance attaches to the fact
that the state of Israel did not exist when the offences were committed”.
 
Under German Penal Code pronounced by the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtsho) in a
judgment of 21/2/2001 3 STR 372/00 in Sokolovic it was held that the same principle should apply in
Germany, at least whenever the obligation to prosecute is provided for in an international treaty binding
upon Germany.
In Italy, Article 7.5 of the Italian Criminal Code prescribes for prosecution of authors of International
Crimes even if they do not find themselves on Italian territory provided;
i)            the crimes are provided in international treaties ratified by Italy.
ii)           under these treaties Italian courts may exercise jurisdiction.
Application of International law principles to this case.
Applying the foregoing International Law, principles to the facts of this case, the High Court in Kenya
clearly has jurisdiction not only to issue warrant of arrest against any person, irrespective of his status, if
he has committed a crime under the Rome Statute, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, but also
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to enforce the warrants should the Registrar of the International Criminal Court issue one.
        In respect of this particular case, two warrants of arrest were issued against President Omar Ahmad
Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir], the sitting President of the sovereign Republic of Sudan on 4th March
2009 with five counts of crime against humanity and two of war crimes on 12th July, 2010 with three
counts of genocide for allegedly orchestrating atrocities in the Western Province of Dafur in Sudan. It is
in evidence, that subsequent to the issuance, the Registrar of the International Criminal Court [ICC] sent
a supplementary request to ask the State parties to the Rome Statute to effect the arrest and surrender
of President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir] should he come to the respective territory.
It is common ground that Kenya is a State party to the Rome Statute. That State parties are under a
duty to execute or extradite the perpetrators of International Crimes to the ICC for prosecution. However
the point of dispute is this: who should implement the instructions of the Pre-trial Chamber. On the
one hand, the Applicant contends that it has the necessary locus standi by reason of its objectives to
seek for the implementation of the request of the Pre-trial Chamber since the good Government of
Kenya has neglected its duty under the Rome Statute. On the other hand the Hon. the Attorney
General of Kenya [for 1st and 2nd Respondents], contends that it has the exclusive authority or mandate
to petition; If he is satisfied, to move the High Court for issuance of warrant and conduct the proceedings
on behalf of the requesting party, That process is done, in this context, by dint of section 29 of the
International Crimes Act, 2008, by the Minister in-charge of Internal Security of the sovereign Republic of
Kenya. Hence the Applicant under both sections should be the State as opposed to the individual such
as the Applicant.
In any event an application for a provisional warrant of arrest under section 32 of the International
Criminal Act, 2008 can only be made upon receipt of a request from the ICC courtesy of Article 92 of the
Rome Statute. Since the request has been made to the Kenya Government by the ICC, the Applicant
lacks the requisite locus standi to prosecute this application. Even if they do [Which is denied] they lack
the requisite capacity to execute the warrants should the same be issued.
The Applicants objectives include and is not limited to the development, strengthening and protection
of the rule of law; and in particular to keep under review all aspects of the rule of law and honour rights
within the Republic of Kenya and to take action as will be of assistance in promoting or ensuring the
enjoyment of these rights.
Pursuant to the said objectives, the Applicant has expressed its concerns about the human rights
record of President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir]. Towards that end, the Applicant is
aware of the existence of two warrants of arrest against the said President for human rights violation in
the Western Province of Dafur in Sudan.
The Applicant, therefore, seeks an order for issuance of a Provisional warrant of arrest against the said
President. That such warrant upon issuance be served upon the 2nd Respondents herein, the Minister of
State for Provincial Administration, to effect the said warrants of arrest, if and when the said President
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sets foot in the territory of the Republic of Kenya.
At issue is whether the Applicant should be granted the orders sought.
In my considered view three aspects must be considered when public interest standing is sought.
i)            Is there a serious issues raised by the applicant?
ii)           Has it been established by evidence that the Applicant is directly affected by the issue
raised? In other words, is it within the mandate of the applicant?
iii)         Does the Applicant have a genuine interest in the matter at hand?
A close scrutiny of the evidence on record, and the mandate disclose, in my judgment, that the Applicant
has a genuine interest in the development, strengthening and protection of the rule of law and human
rights.
        There is also ample evidence that the Pre-Trial chamber of the ICC has issued two warrants on
the 4th March 2009 with five counts of Crimes against humanity and two of war crimes on 12th July 2010
with three counts of orchestrating atrocities in the Western Province of Dafur in Sudan against President
Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al Bashir].
        A request for arrest and surrender has been made to Kenya as a State party to the Rome
Statute pursuant to Article 91 as read together with Article 92 of the said Statute. 
        Subsequent to the issuance of the second warrant of arrest, the Registrar of the International
Criminal Court [ICC] sent a supplementary request on 21st July, 2010 for co-operation to all State Parties
to the Rome Statute for the arrest and surrender of President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al
Bashir] should he set foot in Kenya. The good Government of Kenya has refused, neglected and/ or
ignored to comply with the ICC request even when the said President was in Kenya on 27th August,
2010. What should the High Court do in the face of this impasse? In this regard, it is prudent to compare
the approaches that other common law jurisdictions have taken to grant status to bring action.
Comparison of various approaches taken in other common law jurisdictions to grant parties
status to bring action. 
        By way of comparison, various jurisdictions have taken various approaches on the issue of
standing.
United Kingdom
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        The English Courts have developed three exceptions to the rule that only the Attorney General
can represent the interest of the public. First, an individual may have standing to litigate a question of
public right if the impugned activity simultaneously affects the individuals private rights. Second, an
individual may bring an action claiming a violation of a public right if that individual suffered special
damages as a result of impugned activity. Thirdly, a local authority may bring an action where it
considers it necessary to protect or promote the interests of the citizens within its borders.
        It is noteworthy that these exceptions were affirmed in celebrated authority
of GOURIET-V-UNION OF POST OFFICE WORKERS,[1998]A.C 435, at P.506. In that case the plaintiff
sought standing to obtain an injunction against a postal union. It was argued that the union’s announced
plan that it would not process any mail for South Africa for a period of one week would violate the
Criminal Law. The Attorney General refused to bring an action against the Union. Yet, the House of
Lords refused to grant standing to Gouriet. It held that he could only litigate the issue in a relator action
brought by the Attorney General.
        At the moment, however, there are various statutes in the United Kingdom which provide that a
Court may in certain circumstances grant an applicant leave to bring an action. Recent cases have
turned upon the wordings of the particular statutory provisions.
Australia 
        The Australian Law Reform Commission published a paper on the question of public interest
standing in 1977, [Access to the Courts–I Standing; Public Interest suits (No.4, 1977].
        The report reviewed circumstances which had resulted in demand for increased access to the
Courts in common law jurisdictions. It identified the
 first  as the introduction of legal aid which permitted
disadvantaged citizens to assert their private legal rights. The second was the provision of legal
representations for “diffuse” interest groups in areas such as consumers and environmental protection.
It noted that these organizations often raise issues that are not connected with the private rights or
interest in property which would provide the traditional common law base for standing. The commission
put forward three alternative solutions to the question of when standing should be granted. They were as
follows;
i)            Open Door Policy. This would allow any person to take any proceedings in the public law
area and reliance would be placed in the discipline of costs to limit the number of these cases.
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ii)           United States Method. The so called United States Method would enable the Courts to
screen the proposed plaintiffs as part of the determination of the particular case.
iii)         Preliminary Screening. This method would institute a preliminary screening procedure
which would be undertaken by the Court before the substantive issue would be considered.
It suffices to say the Commission recommended the open-ended approach.
Subsequent to the publication of the law reform report, the High Court of Australia considered the
problem in Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated V. Commonwealth of Australia
[1980], 28 ALR 257[HC] . The foundation was an environmental group very active in Australia. It
challenged the decision made by the Government of Australia to establish a resort area. The challenge
was based upon environmental legislation which, the majority of the High Court concluded, did not
create any private rights. It determined the only duty the legislation imposed was a public one cast upon
the Minster, which was not owed to any one individual. The application of the Conservation Foundation
as a party was therefore rejected.
Canada
In Canada the question of standing was reviewed in more recent case of Finlay V. Canada (Minister
of Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R 607. In that case Le Dain J. speaking for the Court, extended the scope of
the orilogy and held that Courts have discretion to award public interest standing to challenge an
exercise of administrative authority as well as legislation. He based this conclusion on the underlying
principle of discretionary standing which he defined as recognition of the public interest in maintaining
respect for “the limit of statutory authority”.
Given the plethora of authorities in respect of locus-standi as enumerated above, the question which
now begs answer is this: Are the issues raised by the Applicant and the orders sought justiciable? Put in
another way, does the Applicant have the necessary locus-standi to warrant the Court to give it the
orders sought? 
Justiciability: is the Application tenable in law?
In the disclosed circumstances of this case and having taken into consideration the various
approaches taken in other common law jurisdictions to grant parties leave to bring action, I have decided
to adopt the open ended approach. In my considered judgment based on the authorities, the ICJ
–Kenya Chapter, the Applicant, has the necessary locus –standi to bring this application. In my
judgment the matters raised by the Applicant and by extension the orders sought by the Applicant are
justiciable. The application is thus tenable in law. The application thus succeeds to that extent.
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The next pertinent question which this Court ought to grapple or contend with is this: What happens
when the warrants are issued and the Minister for Internal Security fails neglects or refuses to
execute the same?
The answer to that is that any legal person- ICJ Kenya Chapter included- who has the requisite
mandate and capacity to enforce and/or to execute the warrant may be at liberty to do so.
Accordingly, I grant the application in terms of prayer 1,2 of the Chamber Summons dated 18th
November, 2010.
        In the event, however,  the Applicant [ ICJ-Kenya Chapter] has no capacity , it will be at liberty,
should it deem fit, to bring an application for the prerogative order of mandamus, for an order directed
at the Minister in-charge of Internal Security to arrest President Omar Ahmad Hassan Al Bashir [Omar Al
Bashir] should he set foot in Kenya in future. The fate of the mandamus application shall be decided at
another forum – Judicial Review.
Those are the orders I am capable of making considering the purview of this application.
DATED and DELIVERED at Nairobi this 28th day of November, 2011.
 
 
N.R.O. OMBIJA
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